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INTRODUCTION
This study explores how Georgia draws the line between religious freedom and child
abuse. Georgia law contains spiritual exemptions that permit some religious parents to engage in
conduct that would otherwise be prohibited due to its potential harm to children. However, other
religious parents must alter their religious practices to conform to the law. The question about
where Georgia draws the line is an intentionally provocative one, but it is meant to position this
project as an intervention in broader debates about the use of spiritual exemptions to promote
religious freedom and about whether religious practices warrant accommodation. On the one
hand, legal scholars such as Douglas Laycock have argued that neutral, generally applicable laws
can have a disproportionate impact on religious adherents, and spiritual exemptions therefore are
necessary in order to prevent such laws from interfering with these individuals‟ religious
freedom.1 Laycock argues that religion “should proceed as unaffected by government as
possible.”2 Advocates for this position believe that the government should not influence religion
either by conferring special benefits or by imposing any burdens. Most people who subscribe to
this approach perceive religion to be sui generis, and, thus, worthy of special protection from
laws which impose a burden on religious practice. Religious conduct is understood to be
inherently distinct from and superior to other forms of conduct. Therefore, the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution is understood to require
religious exemptions in order to protect religious conduct.
However, not everyone agrees with this perception of religion as something unique or
with the idea that it should be treated separate and distinct from other forms of human conduct.

1

See Douglas Laycock, “Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality toward Religion,” DePaul Law Review
39 (1990): 993-1019.
2
Ibid., 1002

2

Critics point to various problems that arise from automatically requiring spiritual exemptions for
conduct that is otherwise prohibited by legislatures who have determined that regulation is
necessary to protect the public welfare. Scholar and author Marci Hamilton acknowledges that,
in the abstract, “religious liberty” seems to be of paramount importance. However, she argues
that when one “operates from the ground” and applies concrete facts to specific situations it
becomes clear that there are many other liberty interests that should trump a right to unrestricted
religious conduct.3 She cites such examples as the prevention of childhood sexual abuse,
deterring terrorism, and preserving individual property rights.4 Hamilton argues that the simple
fact that an individual or organization is religious should not give it the automatic right to harm
others or infringe upon their respective rights.5
Other scholars, such as Winnifred Sullivan, contend that it is simply impossible to justly
enforce laws which grant legal rights that are defined with respect to an individual‟s religious
beliefs or practices.6 In her book, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, Sullivan argues that
such laws result in legally-defined religious orthodoxy, as legislatures and judges must first
determine what activities count as “real” religion in order to apply these laws. While Sullivan‟s
analysis is based on a single case, she asserts that this problem exists in all circumstances where
the law is used as a mechanism to guarantee religious freedom.7 One aim of this project was to
test her theory and to offer a state-specific analysis that either supports or challenges Sullivan‟s
contention.

3

Marci Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel; Religion and the Rule of Law. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2005), 8.
4
Ibid., 8.
5
Ibid.
6
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 2005), 8.
7
Ibid., 10.
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An examination of Georgia law governing conduct that is both religiously-motivated and
that poses a risk of physical harm to children illustrates that Georgia‟s spiritual exemptions have
contributed to producing legally-defined religious orthodoxy, supporting Sullivan‟s claim. These
exemptions also result in inconsistent regulation of religious conduct and in less stringent state
protection from harm for the children of some religious parents. Therefore, while these spiritual
exemptions are aimed at promoting religious freedom, the practical effect of these laws is that
they promote disparate treatment among religious individuals in Georgia.
Another goal of this project was to obtain a clearer understanding of how the State of
Georgia conceptualizes and values religion and religious freedom. This required an examination
of the specific instances where spiritual exemptions have been granted and denied by statute, as
well as how cases have been interpreted and decided by the courts when the statute is silent.8
This examination illustrated that what counts as religion is often determined by popular
consensus and a connection to foundational Christian tenets. Most significantly, omissions that
are grounded in a belief in the power of prayer and the will of God are offered more legal
protection than explicit acts that are based on an idiosyncratic interpretation of religious
scripture.
This study demonstrates how high the stakes can be when states are determining whether
to offer a spiritual exemption, as well as some potential implications of conceiving of religion as
8

Statutes and case law used in this analysis were chosen based on the specific granting of a spiritual exemption, the
explicit denial of a spiritual exemption by the legislature, or instances where the absence of language addressing
such an exemption led courts to make a determination in light of the religious-motivation behind the conduct in
question. The paper is organized according to these categories of legal data, as this provided a more useful basis for
comparison and analysis than a strictly chronological approach. No clear conclusions can be drawn from simply
following the historical order of the enactment/amendment of statutes and case decisions. See further discussion of
this on p.56. While the goal was to ascertain what we can learn based on the current state of the law in Georgia,
historical data is included where relevant. The cases examined continue to represent good law unless otherwise
noted. No discretion was taken in choosing the particular statutes and cases discussed, but rather this study presents
all relevant data obtained by this author through examination of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, published
case law, and information on unpublished cases obtained through newspaper archive searches, law review and
scholarly journal articles, and scholarly books.
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sui generis. Determinations regarding spiritual exemptions are not always about whether to
exempt a community-based religious organization from residential zoning ordinances or whether
to allow a Jewish military officer to wear his yarmulke despite a military regulation against
wearing headgear indoors.9 At times, these decisions can have life or death consequences for
children. Conceiving of religion as inherently unique, and thus, deserving of spiritual
exemptions, has real life consequences. It may result in the pretty picture so often painted for us
by politicians and religious leaders, one involving pluralism, tolerance, and all the benefits that
can come from promoting religious freedom in our society. However, this same conception
means that religious freedom can also look like a child dying a slow, painful, and, from a
different perspective than that of the religious adherent, altogether unnecessary and preventable
death.
BACKGROUND
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
Determining precisely how and when the government may permissibly accommodate religious
behavior or take action to regulate religion without running afoul of either the First
Amendment‟s Establishment Clause or its Free Exercise Clause has been a source of legal
debate. When and to what extent must religion be treated as different and worthy of special
protection? The United States Supreme Court has answered these questions in various ways over
the years. However, one principle has been consistently maintained throughout: the Free
Exercise Clause does not provide a carte blanche for religious individuals to disregard any and
all laws which may conflict with their religious beliefs and practices. The following section
9

See e.g. Congregation Etz v. Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, 371 F.3d 1122 (2004) and Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503 (1986).
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provides a brief synopsis of several United States Supreme Court decisions relevant to the State
of Georgia‟s ability to regulate religion within its borders.
When Can Religion Be Regulated?
In 1878, the United States Supreme Court first acknowledged a belief-conduct distinction
in Reynolds v. United States when it refused to recognize a religious defense to a bigamy
conviction, holding that “Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but
was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversion of good
order.”10 The Supreme Court found that a law regulating marriage, which was perceived to be a
fundamental part of society, was not prohibited by the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.11 The Court reasoned that permitting an individual to violate the law based on his
or her professed religious beliefs would “permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”12
In 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court first held that First Amendment
protections of the U.S. Constitution applied to the states through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.13 In Cantwell, the Court reaffirmed the distinction between religious
belief and religious action in the context of a challenge to regulation of religious proselytizing,
stating that “The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.”14 However, in addition to reaffirming
this distinction between religious belief and action, the Cantwell decision also expanded the
scope of free exercise. Specifically, in this case which involved religious proselytizing, the Court

10

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
Edward Eagan Smith, “The Criminalization of Belief: When Free Exercise Isn‟t,” Hastings Law Journal 42
(1991): 1495.
12
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
13
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
14
Ibid., 303-304.
11
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held that the state could not ban the dissemination of religious ideas, but it could regulate the
time, place, and manner of this religious practice.
Four years later, the Court followed its rationale in Cantwell when deciding Prince v.
Massachusetts, a case in which a Jehovah‟s Witness parent was prosecuted for violating
Massachusetts child labor laws by allowing her nine-year-old niece to distribute religious
pamphlets on public streets.15 Mrs. Prince was the child‟s legal guardian. Mrs. Prince and her
niece both believed it was their religious duty to perform this work, and Mrs. Prince defended
her actions in terms of religious freedom.16 The Court weighed the religious interest of Mrs.
Prince to raise her child according to her religious beliefs against the interest of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in protecting the welfare of its children, and ultimately found
in favor of the latter:
[T]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of
religious liberty. And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond
limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth‟s well being, the state as parens
patriae17 may restrict the parent‟s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or
prohibiting the child‟s labor and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely
because the parent grounds his claim to control the child‟s course of conduct on religion
or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child
more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not
include the liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the
latter to ill health or death.18
The Prince decision confirmed that the Constitution does not prohibit the states from imposing
restrictions on religious conduct, especially where such limitations are deemed necessary to
ensure the physical health and general welfare of a child. The Prince decision also emphasized
15

Daniel Kearney, “Parental Failure to Provide Child with Medical Assistance Based on Religious Beliefs Causing
Child‟s Death - Involuntary Manslaughter in Pennsylvania,” Dickinson Law Review, 90 (1986): 864.
16
Ibid.
17
Parens patriae is a Latin phrase, meaning “parents of the country.” Black‟s Law Dictionary, Pocket Edition,
1996, s.v. “parens patriae.”
18
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citations and footnotes omitted).
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that the state may limit a parent‟s control over his/her child, if required to protect the child‟s well
being.
Judges have debated to what extent states may or even must grant exemptions for
religious conduct. Even Supreme Court opinions have not always been consistent in their
answers to this question. The standard for many years, though not without exception, was that
when a law burdened the free exercise of religion, the state was required to demonstrate a
compelling interest which justified regulation of the religious conduct.19 However, in 1990, the
controversial Employment Division, Department Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith decision
eliminated the compelling interest standard and reverted back to the standard set out in
Reynolds.20 The Court held that when a law is valid, (religiously) neutral, and generally
applicable, accommodations are not constitutionally required.21 However, while state legislatures
are not obligated to grant spiritual exemptions to such statutes, they are permitted to exercise
their discretion to do so. These spiritual exemptions allow certain religious adherents to engage
in conduct that is otherwise prohibited.
Spiritual exemptions in the area of child welfare law started to receive a great deal of
attention starting in 1974, when Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act (CAPTA). The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW, which in 1980 was
19

The compelling interest standard was established by Sherbert v. Verner in 1963. The Sherbert decision also
determined that the government had to demonstrate that it used the least restrictive means when enacting legislation
that burdened a religious belief or practice. This standard provided a heightened level of protection for religious
conduct, and in particular, for the practices of minority religious groups. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
20
Employment Div. Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
21
Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion, characterized Smith as a clarification of the law, as it had not always been
consistently applied. He denied that the decision was overruling any past decisions. The decision sparked a
“firestorm of controversy” with critics insisting that the decision had “unseated rather than clarified the twentyseven year experience of the Court under the guidance of Sherbert’s compelling interest test…Civil liberty groups
and churches lobbied Congress to pass legislation to reverse the effects of Smith. The tone of critique grew quite
shrill, with some critics going so far as to say that Smith had rendered the Free Exercise Clause meaningless and that
religious freedom would cease to enjoy constitutional protection.” Christopher Eisgruber and Lawerence Sager,
Religious Freedom and the Constitution, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 45.

8

renamed the Department of Health and Human Services, HHS), charged with implementing
CAPTA, interpreted it to require an exemption from child neglect liability for parents who
treated their children with faith healing, and mandated that states adopt religious exemptions
before they could receive federal funding for state child-protection programs.22 The extensive
lobbying of the Christian Science Church was reportedly the source of the religious exemption
clause.23 In 1983, in response to criticism of the religious exemptions, HHS removed the
requirement from CAPTA and left the decision of whether to include a religious exemption up to
the individual states.24
However, while most articles credit CAPTA for the existence of spiritual exemptions to
child neglect statutes across the country, CAPTA is not responsible for the spiritual exemptions
included in Georgia‟s statutes. Georgia‟s spiritual exemption to child medical neglect existed
prior to the CAPTA requirement, and it is not the only spiritual exemption which excuses a
religious parent from a parental responsibility required of all other Georgia parents. The
following section will discuss instances where Georgia grants an explicit spiritual exemption to a
neutral, generally applicable law enacted to ensure the safety and welfare of Georgia‟s children.

22

John T. Gaithings, “When Rights Clash: The Conflict Between a Parent‟s Right to Free Exercise of Religion
Versus His Child‟s Right to Life,” Cumberland Law Review 19 (1988/1989): 591. The terms faith healing and
spiritual healing are used interchangeably by most authors. Therefore, both will appear in this article and generally
refer to a reliance on prayer or other religious practices to heal physical ailments in lieu of medical treatment.
23
Richard Hughes, “The Death of Children by Faith-Based Medical Neglect,” Journal of Law and Religion 20, no. 1
(2004-2005): 248.
24
Ibid. The 1983 version of CAPTA made note of the various criticisms to the religious exemptions, which included
the following: (i) “some children suffer and die as a result of their parents relying on spiritual healing under
circumstances in which medical treatment could have prevented such results;” (ii) “the religious exception impedes
discovery of cases so that even if courts retain their power to order medical treatment, the exercise of that power
often comes too late;” (iii) “all children deserve the protection of the law;” (iv) “the religious exception served to
deny children their constitutional right to life and to equal protection of the law;” and (v) “the religious exception
inhibited criminal prosecution of parents, even if their child had died as a result of the failure to provide medical
treatment.” See Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 48 Fed. Reg. 3698, 3699-3700.
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EXPLICIT STATUTORY SPIRITUAL EXEMPTIONS
There are only a few instances where Georgia grants an explicit statutory spiritual
exemption. However, one exemption is seen repeatedly, and in multiple contexts. This is an
exemption that makes allowances for parents who use spiritual treatment for their children in lieu
of medical treatment.
Section 15-11-2 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A), which defines the
criteria for determining whether a child is deprived of proper parental care and control, and thus,
in need of the state to assume parental responsibility, provides that a deprived child is one who,
among other things, is “without other care or control necessary for the child‟s physical, mental,
or emotional health or morals.”25 A deprived child may remain in the parents‟ custody, subject to
conditions and limitations that the court prescribes, or the child may be removed from their
custody and placed in the custody of the state or other relatives.26 Parents must follow certain
conditions set out by the court, called a case plan, in order to regain custody of their children.27
However, the statute contains the following explicit spiritual exemption, which was enacted in its
current form in 1971:
no child who in good faith is being treated solely by spiritual means through prayer in
accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious
denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof, shall, for that reason alone, be
considered to be a „deprived child.‟28
This exemption allows certain religious parents to engage in conduct that would otherwise be
considered medical neglect, without having to worry about the court restricting or removing their
25

O.C.G.A.§15-11-2(8)(A). O.C.G.A.§15-11-2(2)(C) defines a child as a an individual who is under the age of 18
years.
26
O.C.G.A.§15-11-55(a)(1-2).
27
Ibid.
28
O.C.G.A.§15-11-2(8)(D). This specific language was adopted in 1971. See Ga. L. 1968, p. 1013, §1. However, a
spiritual exemption based on this same criteria, “treatment by spiritual means alone through prayer in accordance
with the tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner
thereof” is found in the statute as early as 1968.
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custodial rights. Advocates of these exemptions argue that they are necessary to protect the
parents‟ right to practice their religion. Otherwise, they would be forced to have their children
undergo medical procedures which they feel are contrary to the child‟s spiritual interests.
However, non-religious parents and other religious parents who do not engage in spiritual
treatment by prayer alone face the threat of losing their custodial rights if they fail to seek
medical treatment for their children when warranted. In addition, they also face the potential for
criminal sanctions.
In Georgia, it is a criminal offense when a parent or guardian “willfully fails to act when
such act or omission could cause a minor to be found to be a deprived child.”29 The penalties for
this crime demonstrate how committed the State of Georgia is to protecting children from
medical neglect in other circumstances. A first offense conviction is a misdemeanor offense, and
the parent faces a fine of up to $1000 and/or up to twelve months in jail. The second conviction
is considered a high and aggravated misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of not less than
$1000 but no more than $5000 and/or not less than one year of imprisonment. The third and
subsequent convictions are considered felony offenses, and the fine is not less than $10,000
and/or one to five years imprisonment. If the omission results in serious injury or death to a
child, upon the first conviction, the parent shall be guilty of a felony and serve one to ten years in
jail with the second or subsequent offense resulting in three to twenty years imprisonment.
However, because a child who is being treated “by spiritual means through prayer” cannot “for
that reason alone, be considered to be a deprived child,” that child‟s parents cannot be held
criminally liable under this statute. Put another way, by virtue of their religious beliefs and
practices alone, the law exempts these parents from both civil and criminal liability for conduct

29

O.C.G.A. §16-12-1(b)(3).
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that is prohibited for all other Georgia parents due to the state‟s interest in protecting children
from harm. This same explicit spiritual exemption is seen in several other statutes as well. For
example, the statute governing the mandatory reporting of child abuse was amended to include
the same exemption language, simply substituting “abused child” for “deprived child.”30 This
explicit spiritual exemption to the definition of an “abused” child is also found in the statute
governing child abuse and deprivation records,31 as well as the statute governing the Central
Child Abuse Registry for Georgia.32
A consequence of these spiritual exemptions is that mandatory reporters in Georgia are
not required to report incidents of parental failure to seek medical treatment, that would
otherwise be considered child abuse or deprivation.33 Even if these incidents were reported, the
Department of Family and Children‟s Services (DFCS) has no authority to investigate such
incidents as, based upon this statutory definition, there would be no suspected “abuse,” and no
records of such allegations will be entered into the Central Child Abuse Registry. Accordingly,
cases involving allegations of medical neglect by parents who are opting to treat their children
with prayer alone may never be reported, much less see the inside of a courtroom.

30

O.C.G.A. §19-7-5(3)(D). The statute was amended to include the exemption clause in 1993.
O.C.G.A. §49-5-49(a)(3)(d). The exemption language was added in 1993. This statute was amended in 2009,
including a change to the spiritual exemption section. Previously, the exemption was contained in a subsection of its
own, (e). The amendment eliminated subsection (e) and the exemption now follows subsection (d) but it is no
longer a separate subsection.
32
O.C.G.A. §49-5-180(5)(C). A spiritual exemption was added in 1995. The current language was adopted in 1996.
33
O.C.G.A. §19-7-5(c) identifies the following individuals as mandatory reporters, “(A) Physicians licensed to
practice medicine, interns, or residents;(B) Hospital or medical personnel; (C) Dentists;(D) Licensed psychologists
and persons participating in internships to obtain licensing pursuant to Chapter 39 of Title 43;(E) Podiatrists;
(F) Registered professional nurses or licensed practical nurses licensed pursuant to Chapter 24 of Title 43;(G)
Professional counselors, social workers, or marriage and family therapists licensed pursuant to Chapter 10A of Title
43; (H) School teachers; (I) School administrators; (J) School guidance counselors, visiting teachers, school social
workers, or school psychologists certified pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title 20; (K) Child welfare agency personnel, as
that agency is defined pursuant to Code Section 49-5-12; (L) Child-counseling personnel; (M) Child service
organization personnel; or (N) Law enforcement personnel.”
31
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Defining Religion
In addition to distinguishing between religious and non-religious parents, analysis of the
particular language used in these spiritual exemptions lends support to Sullivan‟s claim that laws
which grant legal rights that are defined with respect to an individual‟s religious beliefs or
practices inevitably result in legally defined religious orthodoxy. The statutes provide no further
guidance as to how the language of the exemption should be interpreted and applied. Therefore,
a juvenile court judge would have to make a preliminary finding as to whether the treatment was
provided in sufficient “accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or
religious denomination,” which in itself requires a judicial determination of whether the religious
group should be “recognized.” The judge must also determine whether the treatment by prayer is
being performed by a “duly accredited practitioner.”34 While courts are generally loathe to
intervene and assess the legitimacy of religious behavior for fear of engaging in “excessive
government entanglement with religion,”35 application of this exemption requires the courts to
make legal determinations on the “correctness” of religious practice. Reliance on the judicial
system to determine what will be accepted and protected as “religion” is in sharp contrast with
the individualism that is often cited at the heart of religious freedom protections.
The lack of statutory guidance on how to determine whether the exemption criteria are
met means that the standard could vary from county to county, judge to judge, potentially
resulting in very different treatment of the same religious behavior. No Georgia appellate court

34

While the phrase “duly accredited practitioner” is not defined by the statute, it should be noted that Christian
Scientists refer to individuals who have completed a course in spiritual healing given by an authorized teacher of
Christian Science, who devote themselves full time to helping and healing others through prayer, as “practitioners.”
35
Waltz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). See also, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
Also, in Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon, 494 U.S. at 887, Justice Scalia stated, “Repeatedly
and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular
belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim” (citations omitted).
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has issued rulings that would provide precedent for the lower courts, and there are no published
juvenile court decisions to offer specific guidance to a judge facing the issue for the first time.
While no appellate court has addressed the issue, the specific language used in the
spiritual healing exemption clearly appears to favor certain religious individuals over others. The
statute grants an exemption to parents who are part of a recognized church or religious
denomination, but not to parents who are part of “unrecognized” denominations, or who, because
of their own idiosyncratic religious beliefs, choose spiritual treatment by prayer in lieu of
medical treatment. This explicit preference for institutional forms of religious practice effectively
denies equal religious freedom to individuals who perceive themselves to be religious, but who
do not claim to be affiliated with a particular religious institution or to subscribe to a particular
religious doctrine or creed. The mere granting of the exemption also implies that the Georgia
legislature subscribes to the view of religion as unique and worthy of special protection. The law
holds non-religious parents to one standard of parental conduct, while exempting certain kinds of
religious parents from these same requirements.
Other state courts have found precisely this problem. In 1984, Ohio had a religious
exemption to a criminal child endangerment statute with similar language to the Georgia
exemption discussed above. The relevant part of the statute read:
It is not a violation of a duty of care, protection, or support under this division when the
parent, guardian, custodian, or person having custody or control of a child treats the
physical or mental illness or defect of a child by spiritual means through prayer alone, in
accordance with the tenets of a recognized religious body.36
In State v. Miskimens, the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Coshocton County, ruled that the
statute violated the United States Constitution, in part, because it found that Ohio‟s General
Assembly impermissibly engaged in the establishment of religion because the exemption showed
36

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2919.22(A).
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clear “preferential favoring of one group of potential offenders over another group based upon
that group‟s self-proclaimed religious tenets.”37 It also found the statute to be unconstitutionally
vague. In his written decision, Judge Evans enumerated his concerns about how a parent would
be unable to reasonably determine whether they are covered by the exemption.
What is a „religious body?‟ What is a „recognized religious body?‟ By whom must it be
recognized? Must its „tenets‟ be somewhere written down? If not, then how will the
tenets be proven in court? Who will decide what its tenets are? What is meant by
„spiritual‟ means? Does „by spiritual means through prayer alone‟ mean that if we use
some prayer and then also employ some form of non-spiritual treatment such as medicine
or some traditional home remedy that we forfeit our right to claim exemption under this
provision?
As Judge Evans points out, the language of both the Ohio and Georgia exemptions contain
powerful assumptions about the nature of religion. Inherent in the statutory requirements for
exemptions is a conception of religion as organized, doctrinal, hierarchical, and authoritarian.
The lack of explanation or guidance by the legislatures on how these terms are to be defined
indicates an assumption that everyone agrees on what they mean and what real religion looks
like.
With the language of Georgia‟s faith healing exemption so similar to Ohio‟s statute, one
has to wonder whether, if challenged in court, it too would also crumble under close
constitutional scrutiny. However, the bigger question, for the purposes of this paper, is why has it
not been challenged? Is the fact that there are neither appellate court decisions on the proper
interpretation of this statute, nor even any reported trial court decisions meriting significant
media interest or legal commentary in the decades since its original passage, telling in regard to
how this statute is being applied? Are the actions of these Georgia faith healing families simply
going unnoticed? Are these parents going out of their way to make sure their actions are
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unnoticed? Is it only individuals who clearly meet the exemption requirements who are engaged
in these faith healing practices? Are child welfare agencies and prosecutors engaging in a liberal
interpretation of the statute and making the election not to pursue these cases where parents
explain that they are opting to treat their children with prayer instead of medicine, foregoing any
more rigorous scrutiny of the authority and mechanisms by which this spiritual treatment is being
administered?
How Practitioners Understand Their Conduct
While some Georgians may say that the spiritual exemption for faith healing essentially
gives certain parents permission to neglect the medical needs of their children, this is not how
practitioners of spiritual healing understand their actions. They do not see themselves as failing
to care for the medical needs of their child. Instead, they are acting in a manner which they
believe to be in the best interest of their child. Various religious groups base their objection to
medical care on different theological foundations. As discussed above, the most well-known and
vocal faith-based objections to modern medicine come from members of the Christian Science
Church. The Christian Science church has a salaried representative in each state to lobby for
religious exemptions to medical care.38 Christian Scientists believe that their healing techniques
provide the best way to preserve the health of their children.39 For Christian Scientists, seeking
traditional medical treatment is not a sin, but such action is deemed counterproductive to
recovery.40 Christian Scientists view illness as illusory.41 According to their public website,
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Christian Science teaches that all problems, no matter how material they may appear,
have a mental basis. This means that the patient is actually not the body, but the thought
of the person. Therefore, a quick solution through medicine would not address the real
issue, since such a treatment doesn‟t deal with the mental aspect of the condition. Mary
Baker Eddy summed up this phenomenon in Science and Health with Key to the
Scriptures: „Disease is always induced by a false sense mentally entertained, not
destroyed. Disease is an image of thought externalized.‟42
Practitioners help those who seek their services find answers and healing through prayer.
An individual tells the practitioner the problem, and the practitioner offers spiritual concepts for
the individual to work with, and the practitioner prays for the individual as well.43 Christian
Scientists claim to “use spiritual sense to draw inspiration from God, and thereby find that we are
not creating health but finding it.”44
The reason that Christian Science treatment, or prayer, heals is that it opens human
thought to what is actually there, to God‟s infinite goodness, which includes no sickness,
evil, or fear, and to God‟s man, who is deserving of all good. Christian Science treatment
persists in affirming the presence of God and the man made in His image and likeness.45
Christian Scientists have argued that medicine is “just another belief system derived from
the material world.”46 Some Christian Scientists claim that state requirements that parents seek
medical care for their children are essentially an attempt to establish a “religion of medicine in
violation of the Establishment Clause.”47
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The language of the Georgia statute appears to bear the hallmark of Christian Science
lobbying.48 However, while they may be the largest and most politically powerful of the religious
groups who practice faith healing, they are not alone. Scientologists also practice a form of faith
healing. The Followers of Christ, Church of the Firstborn, End Time Ministries, Faith
Tabernacle, and Faith Assembly are Pentecostal sects that also are known to practice faith
healing, rather than seek traditional medical treatment.49 The majority of the members of these
Pentecostal denominations are located outside of Georgia, but transplant or convert practitioners
from these groups, or others like Scientologists, could make an argument that their actions are
covered by the exemption. However, some scholars have argued that terms like “tenets,”
“practitioners,” “spiritual treatment,” and “well-recognized church” tend to privilege the
Christian Science Church and may not be interpreted to apply to newer religious organizations
and smaller denominational sects.50
Members of the Pentecostal sects listed above reject medicine because they believe that
“going to a doctor turns a sick person away from God and serves Satan.”51 The founder of the
Faith Assembly, Hobart Freeman (1920-1984), taught that “the principle methods by which
Satan rules the physical world are pain, sickness, and medicine.” Freeman forbade members of
Faith Assembly from seeking medical treatment. Instead, when Satan was thought to have
attacked members of the church through sickness or pain, they were told to follow James 5:14
48
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and “call for the elders of the church and have them pray over them, anointing them with oil in
the name of the Lord.”52 When children died, Freeman placed blame at the hands of the parents
for their lack of belief, and warned them not to report the deaths to child welfare authorities, “lest
the fellowship be persecuted by the state.”53 In this case, Faith Assembly members do not see
themselves as acting in a manner that is abusive or neglectful of their child‟s medical needs.
They see themselves as doing what is best for the spiritual needs of their child. The medical
ailment is merely a symptom of estrangement from God. The cure is not medicine, but faith.
Christian Scientists certainly see their actions as very different from those of the Faith
Assembly and other Pentecostal sects. Robert Peel, a historian of the Christian Science
movement and a practitioner himself, has even gone so far as to blame the Faith Assembly and
its “dubious practices” for “creating a political backlash against spiritual healing, and
strengthening the alliance between medicine, government agencies, and the courts against the
Christian Science church.”54 Christian Scientists reject the term faith healing to describe their
practice. According to the church‟s website, “Christian Science does not involve pleading with
God to heal the sick and then accepting His will, good or bad. Nothing in Christian Science
theology says it‟s God‟s will that anyone suffer, be sick, or die. Christian Science shows God to
be entirely good, and therefore His will for each individual is only health and life.”55
The Christian Science church has been very successful in their lobbying efforts seeking
what they call “accommodations within the law” to engage in practices which are consistent with
their beliefs about illness. Their success demonstrates the influence that religious groups can
have on the law. The Christian Science church represents a powerful political force, which has
52
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succeeded in altering the legal definition of child abuse in many states. As a result, religious
behavior which was prohibited has become permissible. Clearly, the Georgia legislature has been
persuaded to view these exemptions as a necessary form of religious tolerance. These spiritual
exemptions highlight that the relationship between religion and law is not just one of theoretical
discourse, but rather, it has real life consequences for religious individuals.
Other Explicit Exemptions: Immunizations and Newborn Testing
There are two other instances where Georgia offers an explicit spiritual exemption to a
statutory requirement involving the welfare of a child, and both also involve medical care.
Section 31-12-7 of the O.C.G.A. requires the Department of Human Resources to promulgate
appropriate rules and regulations governing required testing of newborn infants for sickle cell
anemia, sickle cell trait, and other metabolic and genetic disorders. The statute makes it clear that
the goal is to identify “as nearly as possible all newborn infants” who are susceptible or likely to
have one of these conditions, so that they can be tested and have treatment initiated.56 The
legislature has determined this diagnosis and treatment of sickle cell disease or trait to be so
important to the health and welfare of its children that it mandates free counseling be made
available to anyone requesting it regarding “the nature of the disease, its effects, and its
treatment.”57 It also sets a limit on the costs associated with the newborn “screening, retrieval
and diagnosis” at no more than $40 for the calendar year, and states that “no services shall be
denied on the basis of inability to pay.”58 However, despite the legislature‟s clear interest in
making sure that children who have sickle cell or other metabolic and genetic disorders are
identified and treated to avoid unnecessary heath complications, the statute contains an
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exemption that states “this code section shall not apply to any infant whose parents object thereto
on the grounds that such tests and treatment conflict with their religious tenets and practices.”59
Furthermore, Section §20-2-771 of the O.C.G.A. governs the immunization requirements
for children attending public or private day-care/nursery, or educational programs for
kindergarten through twelfth grade.60 The statute creates a requirement that all students are
required to obtain certain immunizations in order to attend a day-care facility or school. The
importance the legislature places on these immunizations is clear, as the code states that “any
responsible official permitting a child to remain in a school or facility in violation of this Code
section, and any parent or guardian who intentionally does not comply with this Code section
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor” and face a $100 fine and up to 12 months in jail.61 Parents
whose children are not admitted to school because they lack the appropriate vaccinations also
face criminal prosecution for the truancy of their child.62
However, despite the seeming importance of protecting all children from preventable
diseases, the statute provides the following religious exemption:
This Code section shall not apply to a child whose parent or legal guardian objects to
immunization of the child on the grounds that the immunization conflicts with the
religious beliefs of the parents or guardian; however, the immunization may be required
59
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in cases when such disease is in epidemic stages. For a child to be exempt from
immunization on religious grounds, the parent or guardian must first furnish the
responsible official of the school or [childcare] facility an affidavit in which the parent or
guardian swears or affirms that the immunization required conflicts with the religious
beliefs of the parent or guardian.63
The newborn testing and vaccination exemptions certainly seem to make more
allowances for individual religious belief than the spiritual treatment exemptions. The same
preference for institutional religion that is evident in those exemptions does not exist here.
Religious beliefs of any kind are enough to allow a parent the option of choosing whether to test
their newborn for metabolic disorders or vaccinate them against disease. It is only if the children
fall ill as a result of these decisions and choose to treat their child with prayer alone that the
parent must demonstrate a connection to a form of institutional “recognized” religion to be
granted the choice to rely on their religious beliefs in lieu of medicine. However, application of
these exemptions still necessitates a determination of what amounts to “tenets and practices” in
the newborn exemption and what beliefs qualify as “religious” for the vaccination exemption.
These exemptions clearly allow religious parents a kind of parental autonomy that is unavailable
to non-religious parents. Without proper guidance on how they are to be interpreted and applied,
there is again the potential for the same religious conduct, i.e. abstaining from newborn testing or
immunization of children because of one‟s spiritual beliefs, to be treated very differently on a
case by case basis.64 This once again sets the stage for the creation of legally defined religious
orthodoxy, and inconsistent regulation of the same religious conduct.
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EXPLICIT DENIAL OF A SPIRITUAL EXEMPTION
In contrast to the explicit exemptions granted for spiritual treatment by prayer,
vaccination requirements, and newborn testing, Georgia has explicitly denied a spiritual
exemption for female genital mutilation.65 An examination of this statute demonstrates that the
free exercise of religion is not always given statutory precedence over the State‟s interest in
protecting children from physical harm.
Background on the Practice of FGM/FC
Female genital mutilation (FGM) is also known as female circumcision (FC) by those
who engage in the practice.66 According to author David Guinn, who devotes a chapter to the
practice in his book, Faith on Trial: Communities of Faith, The First Amendment, and the
Theory of Deep Diversity, the practice of FGM/FC is not a single practice, but encompasses four
different types of ritual genital surgery. Type 1 involves pricking to draw blood or removing the
clitoral hood or prepuce. This procedure results in a low incidence of medical complications and
should not preclude sexual intercourse or orgasms. Type 2 involves removal of the clitoris. In
Type 3, the clitoris and parts of the labia minora are removed. In Type 4 procedures, the clitoris,
parts of the labia minora and labia majora are removed and “the gaping wound to the vulva is
stitched together, often leaving only a small opening through which urine and menstrual flow
may be evacuated.”67 Type 4 procedures require ongoing maintenance and the scar tissue
covering the vulva must be cut to allow child-birth and then re-sewn to maintain its character.
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Medical complications are more frequent with Types 2-4, the most commonly practiced forms of
FGM/FC, and in these instances a woman‟s capacity for sexual pleasure is reduced or
eliminated.68 The surgery generally takes place on young girls ranging in age from 6-12 years of
age and is often associated with her initiation into womanhood. FGM/FC, typified by Types 2-4
above, has been condemned as a violation of women‟s rights by a number of international
forums, as critics believe that FGM/FC seeks to deny and control women‟s sexuality by
removing the organs of sexual pleasure.69 Supporters of the practice emphasize that “the practice
simply supports non-Western values, including the belief that FGM/FC promotes female
beauty.”70 Women who have undergone the procedure and endorse the practice state that the
ritual is “an important part of their cultural heritage or their religion.”71 Third World feminists
often argue that the West is hypocritical in condemning the practice “when it condones plastic
surgery that, in many cases, may be equally harmful.”72 FGM/FC has been condemned as a
health hazard by the World Health Organization.73 However, “the level of harm caused to a
female by Type 1, may in fact be less than the harm caused to a male child who undergoes
circumcision.”74
Religious Motivation
FGM/FC is performed by certain groups who claim no religious motivation, as well as by
individuals who claim that their religious beliefs are at the heart of their desire to have their
68
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daughters undergo the procedure. FGM/FC is most commonly identified with Muslims, though
the practice also occurs among Christians, animists, and one Jewish sect.75 However, critics have
argued that while it occurs among religious groups, it is not a true religious practice because “no
religion requires it.”76 For instance, while the Qur‟an does not mention the practice, there are two
hadith on which some practitioners rely as a religious basis for FGM/FC. The Prophet reportedly
stated: “Circumcision is an ordinance in men and an embellishment in women.”77 In another
instance, the Prophet reportedly said the following in a conversation with women who
circumcised girls in Mecca, “reduce but do not destroy. This is enjoyable to the woman and
preferable to the man.”78
Similarly, the practice of FGM/FC has not been adopted by most Christians or Jews.
However, Guinn explains that while no clear authority for the practice exists in the Hebrew or
Christian Bible, “Judaism and Christianity generally interpret biblical commands that may in the
original text be written in the masculine tense as applicable to both men and women.”79
Therefore, Guinn believes this to be the basis for some groups interpreting the biblical command
supporting male circumcision to also be supportive of female circumcision.80
The Statute
Under Georgia law, there is no distinction between the types of female circumcision
discussed above. O.C.G.A. §16-5-27 states,
(a) Any person:
75
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(1) Who knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates, in whole or in part, the labia
majora, labia minora, or clitoris of a female under the age of 18 years of age;
(2) Who is a parent, guardian, or has immediate custody or control of a female under the
age of 18 years of age and knowingly consents to or permits the circumcision, excision,
or infibulations, in whole or in part, of the labia majora, labia minora, or clitoris of such
female; or (3) Who knowingly removes or causes or permits the removal of a female
under 18 years of age from this state for the purpose of circumcising, exising, or
infibulating, in whole or in part, the labia majora, labia minora, or clitoris of such female
shall be guilty of female genital mutilation.
A person who is convicted of female genital mutilation shall be punished by imprisonment for
not less than five and not more than twenty years.81
The legislature has also made clear that religious motivation, no matter how central, does
not change the state‟s position on the criminality of the act. Subsection (d) states
consent of the female under 18 years of age or the parent, guardian, or custodian of the
female under 18 years of age shall not be a defense to the offense of female genital
mutilation. Religion, ritual, custom, or standard practice shall not be a defense to the
offense of female genital mutilation.
The statute developed in response to the case of State v. Adem, in which the State of
Georgia became the first in the nation to prosecute and convict an individual for female genital
cutting.82 Khalid Misri Adem is an Ethiopian immigrant who, in 2003, was accused by his wife,
Fortunate, of circumcising their two-year-old daughter‟s clitoris with a pair of scissors.83 On the
witness stand, Adem‟s wife, Fortunate, stated the following,
[H]e said there is a cultural tradition at home that all the little girls and all the women
have to go through. And if it‟s not done it brings shame to the family. And that he wanted
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to have her clitoris cut out so that it could preserve her virginity. And that was, it was the
will of God.84
Adem maintained his innocence throughout the trial, claiming he had not committed the act.
Therefore, he never raised a religious defense. The prosecutor did not focus on the fact that
Adem was Muslim; instead he focused on Adem‟s “culture,” though he never defined exactly
what constituted the term.85 There are no constitutional protections for the free exercise of
culture. Therefore, representing undefined “culture” as the culprit allowed the prosecutor to
indict Adem‟s overall worldview and way of life without having to specifically discuss religion
or worry that he may be treading on First Amendment ground. He was able to disparage
Ethiopian culture without appearing anti-Muslim in the wake of 9/11.
In her essay “Culture,” Tomoko Masuzawa explains the different perceptions that exist
regarding the relationship between religion and culture:
In the contemporary use of the terms, the relationship between “culture” and “religion”
appears to be multiple, complex and contradictory to some extent. First, in a highly
ordinary sense, religion is seen as one of the cultural aspects or institutions of a given
society…If at times religion is to culture as a part is to the whole, at other times the
synecdochic relation amounts to a plain equation, with the result that in such cases
culture is considered more or less synonymous with religion…On the other hand, most
notably in the language of theologians and other partisans of religion, religion is claimed
to be that which always and necessarily exceeds culture, something essentially distinct
from, surpassing, and sometimes standing decidedly against culture.86
Under the Georgia statute that criminalizes FGM (the term used in the statute), religion is named
along with ritual, custom, and standard practice, as distinct elements, none of which, amount to a
defense for the commission of the act. Religion was not originally included in the first version of
the bill, which stated only that “neither ritual nor custom shall be a defense.”87 The more
84
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sweeping terminology which includes religion was added after further consideration and was
“intended to prevent the cultural defense from sneaking in” under another name.88 While naming
each of these separately, one could argue that Georgia is making clear that no single part, or the
collective whole, of a person‟s culture shall serve to allow them to engage in FGM/FC. In this
instance, religion is not treated as something that exceeds culture, but rather is equivalent to it. In
contrast, in the other instances where we have seen spiritual exemptions, such as for the spiritual
treatment of illness, the law seems to imply that religion is something distinct from, and, indeed,
surpasses the ordinary customs, practices, and legal obligations of the larger American society.
The result of these different ways of understanding religion and culture is that practitioners of
FGM/FC must alter their religious practice in order to conform to the law, whereas the law has
conformed to those who practice spiritual healing.
Why would religion be treated so differently under different circumstances? Is it the kind
of religion that changes the treatment of it under the law? It is certainly not based on the potential
for physical harm to a child. The risk of medical complications and physical suffering from Type
I FGM/FC is significantly less than the risk of harm from untreated diabetes or bacterial
meningitis, which are likely to cause death without medical intervention. In terms of the way the
participants understand their conduct, each are acting in accordance with their religious beliefs.
Yet spiritual healing has been granted an exemption and female circumcision, even when
performed for religious reasons, has been deemed a criminal act. If the risk of harm to children is
not the underlying determinate, then what is? Steffen believes that the evidence against Khalid
Adem was extremely questionable and that he now “passes his days in a medium-security prison
not because the prosecution in his case proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but because
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he came to symbolize the Other, or rather Others.”89 Adem came to represent the unfamiliar, the
unknown, and the undesired. His kind of “culture,” whatever that included, was not our culture,
and no one advocated an expansion of our definition to include his. People often fear and reject
that which they do not understand and cannot relate to, while they treasure and celebrate that
which is familiar. This is likely the reason that religion in the form of prayer explicitly serves as
a defense to child abuse, but religion is explicitly rejected as a defense to FGM/FC.
WHEN THE STATUTE IS SILENT
Thus far, we have been looking at spiritual exemptions, or denials of such, that are made
clear by the black letter of the law. But what about when the statute does not offer or deny an
exemption in its plain language? How do Georgia child welfare workers, police officers,
prosecutors and courts handle cases where religion is clearly a motivating factor behind conduct
that is otherwise prohibited? Once again, it seems to depend on the kind of religious conduct.
Judicial interpretation based on personal beliefs and popular consensus appears to strongly effect
which forms of religious conduct are protected and which are not.
What Counts As Religion?
Individual conceptions of what counts as “religion” undoubtedly influence whether
judges recognize spiritual exemptions when the statute is silent on the matter. Consider the
following example. In a 1986 case, Hunt v. State, the defendants appealed a conviction for child
molestation which stemmed from their participation in a Wicca religious ceremony.90 Judge P.J.
Deen called the ceremony “a Wicca „religious‟ ceremony of witchcraft and nudity adding up to
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almost a sexual orgy involving little children.”91 In his special concurrence, Judge Deen
discussed his belief that the Wicca tradition does not amount to a real religion. Deen stated that
“it should be observed that an assembly place for adherents of the Wicca „faith,‟ qualified by the
Supreme Court as a religion, may be exempt from state taxation…but neither the place of Wicca
„worship‟ nor the Wicca adherents are exempt from the criminal code of the State of Georgia.”92
Deen comments on the decision by the United States Supreme Court to define a religion for tax
exempt purposes as non-theistic traditions as well as theistic traditions, and the decision of the
Georgia Supreme Court to grant tax exempt status to Ravenwood Church of Wicca in 1982,
stating “While we are bound by the Georgia Supreme Court, the writer does not believe the U.S.
or Georgia Constitutions mandate providing tax exemptions for non-theistic religions. Wicca
witch-warlock worship was not within the original intent of the founding fathers.”93 Deen
described the Wicca ceremony at issue in Hunt as an example of “the definition of „religion‟
having been stretched beyond recognition” adding that “it is fast becoming impossible to ignore
some of the evils of religion, or rather doing whatever one cherishes or feels good about doing,
but which conduct violates the criminal code of conduct under the guise of „religion.‟”94
Judge Deen made no effort to hide his contempt for the Wicca tradition. For him, it did
not amount to real religion, worthy of protection. Defining religion often seems to be a matter of
distinguishing “good” religion from “bad” religion. Judge Deen made it clear that because the
Wiccan defendants violated a criminal statute, their “religion” would offer them no protection.
Other judges have similarly refused to consider religious motivation as a defense for otherwise
criminal conduct.
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Religiously-Motivated Discipline
Other judges have been similarly unwilling to recognize spiritual exemptions where the
religious motivation for the conduct is not widely shared or accepted by other religious
individuals in Georgia. One of the most widely publicized cases in Georgia history involved
House of Prayer, a northwest Atlanta church, whose pastor advocated “whippings” for “unruly”
children.95 In 2001, an investigation began after a 10-year-old boy and a 7-year-old boy were
found to have welts and bruises on their bodies, which the 10-year-old reported were the result of
beatings he received at his church.96 The whipping of children was commonplace at House of
Prayer, and the punishment was administered at the direction of Reverend Arthur Allen, Jr.
Children who were being punished were suspended in the air by their hands and arms and beaten
with switches, sticks or belts.97 Allen said the beatings were simple discipline. “The Bible says
that if you spare the rod you‟re going to spoil the child,” Allen said.98 “I have the Scriptures that
give me the right to do it.”99 However, the State of Georgia disagreed. In total, forty-nine
children were removed from their parents‟ custody and placed into foster care, and five members
of the church, including Reverend Allen were convicted of cruelty to children.
In 2001, Georgia permitted the use of physical forms of discipline without it constituting
child abuse, “as long as there is no physical injury to the child.”100 The fact that these beatings
occurred as part of the House of Prayer church services and were performed in accordance with
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their religious beliefs based on their interpretation of the Bible was irrelevant to the judges.
Juvenile Court Judge Sanford Jones, who authorized the placement of forty-one of the children
into foster care, stated, “I hate to see these children jeopardized by what I consider to be a
cult.”101 Juvenile Court Judge George Blau, who authorized the removal of an additional seven
House of Prayer children from the custody of their parents stated, “Our country was founded
basically on freedom of religion…Freedom of religion is freedom of belief---not necessarily
freedom of practice. The overdiscpline of children is not allowed.”102
Clearly, Judge Jones would not have considered granting a religious exemption in this
case because he did not consider the House of Prayer to be a legitimate religious organization.
This example reinforces that only those religions deemed to be “real” by a judge, e.g. the right
kind of religion, are eligible to receive special protection. If religion is treated as unique and
therefore deserving of special protection, a judicial determination of what constitutes a religion is
required. Judge Blau, on the other hand, seemed to accept the House of Prayer as a religious
organization, but he simply did not find the fact that the congregant‟s actions were rooted in their
religious beliefs sufficient to warrant special legal protection. The congregants may believe in
the spiritual necessity of corporal punishment. However, because they acted upon this belief in a
manner that resulted in physical harm to a child, they were subject to legal consequences.
House of Prayer church members fared no better in their criminal cases. Convicted of
aggravated assault and cruelty to children for causing cruel and excessive physical or mental
pain, Allen and other church members who participated in the beatings were sentenced to serve
time in jail and pay fines. Allen‟s sentence was the greatest. He received ninety days in jail and
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an $8,000 fine. He was also sentenced to ten years probation. As a condition of their probation,
Judge T. Jackson Bedford ordered each of the defendants to “restrict any spanking to their own
children, generally only in the presence of immediate family members, to use only an open hand
on a child‟s buttocks during such punishment, and to complete an intensive counseling
program.”103 He also banned them from bringing their children to the House of Prayer for
punishment and from advising or assisting other parents with punishing their children.104 These
terms required that the convicted members alter their religious practices as they pertain to child
discipline. “It doesn‟t allow me to preach all the Bible, so that‟s just ungodly,” Allen said.105
Similarly, all House of Prayer parents had to alter the extent of the biblically-based corporal
punishment of their children, or they risked the loss of their custodial rights. Religious
motivation was not enough to exempt these individuals from the laws that all other Georgia
parents must follow, nor from the consequences that result if these laws are broken.
Demonic Possession - What‟s a Parent to Do?
The case of Sonya and Josef Smith provides yet another example where a court did not
allow the religious motivation of the parents to exempt them from liability for causing harm to
their child. The Smiths, who lived in Mabelton, Georgia, were members of the Remnant
Fellowship, a church based in Williamson, County Tennessee, but which has a national
following via the internet. Remnant Fellowship was founded by Gwen Shamblin, who developed
a following of thousands with a Christian diet plan called the Weigh Down Workshop. The
Remnant Fellowship advocates corporal punishment for children and, in a video obtained by
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WTVF News Channel 5 out of Nashville, Tennessee, Shamblin was heard advising parents, “If
they‟re not scared of a spanking, you haven‟t spanked them. If you haven‟t really spanked them,
you don‟t love them. You love yourself.”106 One Remnant Fellowship member explained that
while she first hesitated to use physically discipline with her children for fear of hurting them,
she now utilizes such methods “in order to save their souls from hell rather than being concerned
about their flesh.”107 One former member explained to Channel 5 that “glue sticks are actually
sort of common within the Remnant Fellowship culture to be used to discipline children.”108 He
explained that the glue sticks hurt like switches, but do not leave marks on the children. In
addition to corporal punishment, other methods of discipline, which the Smiths employed upon
the advice of church leaders, included locking their child in a small room with only a Bible for
days at a time. 109
According to police reports, Josef Smith believed his eight-year-old son Josef was “a
soldier of the devil,” and Josef was routinely whipped and often locked in a closet for days or
even weeks at a time.110 At trial, Josef‟s older brother Mykel Booth, age 16, testified that on
October 8, 2003, the family was watching a webcast of a Remnant Fellowship Church Service,
when Josef began screaming and cursing, as he typically did when the family engaged in
religious activity. Mykel was told by the Smiths to put Josef inside a wood-lined chest. An
extension cord was wrapped around the box to keep Josef inside. After ten or fifteen minutes,
Josef became silent. When his brother opened the chest, Josef was unresponsive. He died in a
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hospital a few hours later.111 The exact cause of death was debated among medical examiners,
but what they did agree on was that Josef‟s death was the result of homicide, not accident or
illness.112
Police reported that Josef and Sonya Smith “showed no remorse” and were “very
defensive about their religion.”113 The Smiths were ultimately found guilty of felony murder,
felony involuntary manslaughter, child cruelty, and aggravated assault.114 None of these crimes
have a religious exemption.115 Despite the fact that the boy‟s body was covered with bruises and
scars, the family contended that the boy‟s death was the result of an infection brought on by a
skin condition. They defended their actions saying that they did nothing wrong, only spanking
him, “repeatedly but harmlessly, based on what they believe the Bible teaches about corporal
punishment.”116 The jury, however, disagreed. “„I think the jury sent a message to the
community‟ said the prosecutor, Senior Assistant District Attorney Eleanor Dixon, „that they‟re
not going to allow this type of child abuse to happen here in Cobb County.‟”117 In 2007, on the
anniversary of their son‟s birthday, the Smiths were sentenced to life plus thirty years.118
Interestingly, this case also demonstrates the different ways that child welfare workers
interpret and react to religious beliefs involving demon possession. Josef‟s half sister had made a
report to the Henry County DFCS office, the county where she resided, to warn them that she
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suspected Josef was being abused.119 She described Josef “as „demon-possessed‟ with „his eyes
rolling in the back of his head as if he were going through some transformation.‟...She reported
that the parents also claimed the boy was demon-possessed, had placed video cameras around the
home to observe him and were providing no mental health services.”120 Henry County DFCS
forwarded the report to Cobb County, where the Smiths resided, but no action was taken. Henry
County DFCS repeated the request, but still no action was taken. Cobb County DFCS Director,
Catherine Anderson, defended her agency‟s decision stating, “There‟s nothing in that memo that
says the parents might beat a child to death.”121
This explanation from Ms. Anderson may be interpreted simply as a post ex facto
exculpation. However, it also seems to demonstrate that child welfare workers sometimes
disagree as to whether the belief that one‟s child may be possessed by the devil warrants a DFCS
investigation. In Henry County, DFCS workers would have looked into the situation, whereas in
Cobb County they did not feel the situation was a cause for concern. They are not alone. On June
12, 2009, Sandra Alfred of Lilburn, Georgia was arrested on charges of false imprisonment and
cruelty to children for using handcuffs on her 15-year-old son, and denying him food and water
for periods of up to twelve hours, while she performed an exorcism on him. Alfred believed her
son to be possessed by Satan and told officers who responded to complaints of an unruly child
that they “were sent by God as angels to help her.”122 Doctors who later examined the boy
believed he was suffering from the onset of schizophrenia.123 Gwinnett County Magistrate Judge
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Robert Mitchum made headlines when he dismissed the warrants against the mother, citing as
rationale in part, “I have a hard time believing you‟re going to get anybody to say in Gwinnett
County, Georgia, that Satan doesn‟t exist, that the Bible doesn‟t exist, that the actual Biblical
descriptions of possession are not true…You‟re not going to get anybody to say that that‟s all
false. So it‟s going to be really hard to claim that the basic precept behind any of her actions
were false, malicious, or criminal.”124
Mitchum‟s determination that the mother‟s belief in demonic possession was
unquestionably true, based on his perception of a public consensus, demonstrates the role that
popular opinion plays in making these determinations. Presumably, a parent who handcuffed
their schizophrenic teenager, and deprived them of food and water in order to rid them of the
spirit of Elvis Presley, would not be likely to get off so easy. They would be expected to have
sought medical/mental health treatment for their child. Mitchum‟s rationale was based on his
assessment that everyone in Gwinnett County would agree that there is a devil and that what the
Bible says about possession is true. The fact that he believed there to be a consensus among the
residents of Gwinnett County regarding the truth of Alfred‟s beliefs was sufficient for him to
determine that neither her beliefs nor her actions were wrong, and therefore, they could not be
criminal. By contrast, the religious basis for the conduct of the House of Prayer parents who
allowed their children to be subjected to excessive physical discipline, as well as those who
actually doled it out, was not enough to decriminalize their actions. They were even deemed a
“cult” by one judge, and their actions were viewed as nothing more than abuse, cloaked in the
garb of religion. The House of Prayer congregants and the Smiths represented the “other,” fringe
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religious groups, whose practices warranted no protection. Alfred‟s actions, while not
commonplace, were based upon a belief shared by the majority, and this made her religious
actions real religion and thus deserving of protection.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN GEORGIA
It should be evident by now that not all religious conduct is treated equally under the law
in Georgia. Some religious conduct is explicitly offered protection by statute, other conduct is
specifically outlawed by statute, and other conduct must undergo the scrutiny of a judge who will
determine whether the conduct is in fact religious, and, if so, whether it is deserving of special
protection. The form of religious conduct which receives the most legal protection is, of course,
that which is statutorily guaranteed. This section will explore what the existence of these
statutory exemptions can tell us about religious freedom in Georgia: What value is placed on it?
When and how may it be limited? What are the practical results of offering religious freedom in
the form of spiritual exemptions? Can any historical trends be discerned?
The Value of Religious Freedom
One can infer from the existence of the explicit spiritual exemptions discussed above
(spiritual treatment, newborn testing, and vaccination exemptions) that the Georgia legislature
places an extremely high value on the freedom of certain kinds of religious parents‟ to choose
prayer in lieu of medical treatment, faith in lieu of science. All of the explicit spiritual
exemptions are contrary to Georgia‟s public policy on protecting its children from suffering
unnecessary physical harm or death. Children are the future citizens of the state and the nation;
therefore, the legislature has set very clear standards on parental behavior which are meant, in
part, to ensure that these children live safe and healthy lives, so that they may grow up to become
productive adults. Therefore, the fact that the Georgia legislature has granted these spiritual
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exemptions is indicative of the value the legislature has placed on freedom of religion in this
context. This is particularly true since it is under no constitutional obligation to do so and these
spiritual exemptions stand in contradiction to the state‟s interest in protecting Georgia‟s current
and future citizens. In fact, it appears that this freedom of religion, assuming you are found to be
practicing the right kind of religion, is valued above the life of a child in these circumstances.125
In all instances where Georgia law contains an explicit spiritual exemption, a child‟s life could
foreseeably end as a result. All other parents are statutorily required to seek medical care when
their child is sick, they must have their children screened for serious illnesses at birth, and they
must vaccinate their children to prevent them from contracting a preventable disease that could
lead to their death. However, by virtue of their religion, some parents are exempted from these
parental duties despite the potential for harmful consequences. This clearly suggests a legislative
commitment to religious tolerance for these practices that outweighs Georgia‟s commitment to
protecting these children from medical neglect.
These exemptions allow religious parents to make medical decisions for their children in
accordance with their faith, but in the case of the vaccination exemption the potential impact of
these decisions goes beyond a parent‟s relationship to his/her own child. Failure to vaccinate
one‟s child affects not only that child, but other members of the greater community with whom
that child may come into contact. For instance, in January 2008, an intentionally unvaccinated
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child from San Diego, California contracted the measles while on a family trip to Switzerland
and then unknowingly carried the disease back to the United States. The incident resulted in the
exposure of 839 individuals, 11 additional cases, and the hospitalization of one infant too young
to be vaccinated. The net public-sector cost for each of the confirmed cases of the illness was
$10,376 per case. Forty-eight children too young to be vaccinated against the measles were
quarantined, at an average family cost of $775 per child.126 A similar scenario could easily occur
in Georgia as well.
In addition to the risk posed to children who are too young to receive the vaccination,
intentionally unvaccinated children also pose a risk to children who cannot receive the vaccine
due to medical conditions, such as cancer. Stephanie Tatel, the mother of a two-and-a-half year
old with Leukemia, expressed her frustration in an article for Slate Magazine.
Ordinarily, I wouldn‟t question others‟ parenting choices. But the problem is literally
one of live or don‟t live. While that parent chose not to vaccinate her child for what she
likely considers well-founded reasons, she is putting other children at risk…A single
unimmunized child in an ordinary child care setting is the equivalent of a toddler time
bomb to him…Because what‟s „just a case of chicken pox‟ for that kid could be a matter
of life or death for mine.127
Interestingly, these scenarios demonstrate that the negative implications which can be drawn
from the use of spiritual exemptions to promote religious freedom are not limited to instances
where institutional forms of religion are favored over individualism. Essentially, Georgia‟s
vaccination exemption allows the religious beliefs of one family to potentially affect the health
of a child in another family.
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Limitations on Religious Freedom
The fact that Georgia legislators place countless children (and adults) at risk for illness or
death to preserve the religious liberty of a few unrelated individuals is again demonstrative of the
value placed on this form of free exercise in Georgia. On the other hand, tolerance for this kind
of religious belief is hardly unlimited. The vaccination exemption explicitly states that “the
immunization may be required in cases when such disease is in epidemic stages.” So does this
mean Georgia‟s religious tolerance ends when an epidemic begins? If so, the granting of such an
exemption seems to be somewhat disingenuous, giving the illusion of tolerance, but in reality,
reserving the right to pull the plug on the exemption in times of medical crisis. The value of
religious freedom, therefore, appears to be variable and context dependent.
The faith healing exemption may too have its limitations. Working with Child
Deprivation Cases in Georgia's Juvenile Courts: A Reference Manual for Department of Family
and Children Services Case Managers, which was developed by the Georgia Supreme Court
Child Placement Project in 2004, states that “Although no court has defined the exact boundaries
of this statutory exception, some commentators have suggested that if a child's life or long term
health are endangered due to a lack of medical care, state intervention is still appropriate
regardless of the justification posed by the parents.”128 This manual is clear that “This issue has
yet to be resolved.”129
While this precise issue remains unresolved, in other circumstances involving religiouslybased medical neglect, courts have ordered state intervention when a child‟s life was at risk. In
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Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld a
court order by the Butts County Superior Court which transferred temporary custody of an
unborn child to the Department of Human Resources. The order also required the mother to
undergo an emergency cesarean section after she had refused to do so on religious grounds in a
situation where doctors deemed it probable that the child, and quite possibly the mother, would
have died during natural delivery.130 Jessie Mae Jefferson suffered from a condition known as
complete placenta previa, in which the placenta blocks the opening of the birth canal. Her
examining physician found that it was virtually impossible that the condition would correct itself
prior to delivery, and that there was a 99% certainty that the child could not survive a natural
delivery. The chances of the mother surviving were cited as no better than 50%. The examining
physician gave the opinion that both mother and child had an almost 100% chance of survival if
Jefferson delivered via caesarean prior to the beginning of labor.131
Ms. Jefferson‟s husband was the pastor of Shiloh Sanctified Holiness Baptist Church in
Butts County, Georgia, and she was reportedly a believer in faith healing.132 She refused to
consent to the cesarean section because she believed that the “Lord has healed her body and that
whatever happens to the child will be the Lord‟s will.”133 The Superior Court found the fetus to
be a deprived child, and granted custody of the child to state and county authorities, allowing
them to make all medical decisions related to the child. Jefferson was ordered to submit to a
caesarean section and all related procedures necessary to save the life of her unborn child.134 In
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making its decision, the court said it “weighed the right of the mother to practice her religion and
to refuse surgery on herself, against her unborn child‟s right to live. We found in favor of her
child‟s right to live.”135 Interestingly, in deciding whether to find the fetus to be a deprived child,
the court did not specifically discuss the facts of the case with reference to the spiritual
exemption. This is surprising given that in 1981, the definition of a deprived child, which the
Superior Court would certainly have considered in its decision-making process, included the
identical spiritual exemption language that the statute contains today. In fact, neither the Superior
Court in its initial decision, nor the Supreme Court upon its review, makes any mention of the
exemption at all. This leads one to the conclusion that the exemption was not seen to as
applicable to the facts of this case. Perhaps Jefferson‟s belief that her prayers would result in
divine healing was not seen as equivalent to “treatment by prayer alone.” Perhaps her belief was
not sufficiently tied to the “tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious
denomination.” Therefore, while their decision makes clear that there are instances where
Georgia is willing to place the life of a child above the right of a parent to practice their religion,
it is still unclear how a court will rule in a situation where the practices in question are deemed to
fall under the exemption. In an ironic twist in the Jefferson case, when Jefferson reported to the
hospital for her court ordered sonogram preceding her caesarean section, it was discovered that
her condition had corrected itself, something doctors had deemed “highly and virtually
impossible.”136 A spokesperson for Jefferson stated that she believed “prayers moved the
placenta.”137
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One Georgia Juvenile Court Judge, Edward D. Wheeler, has commented on other forms
of religious-based medical neglect, in a ruling that set a standard by which to measure the state's
interests against the parents' First Amendment rights. Deciding In the Interest of L.O.L. in 1984,
Judge Wheeler authorized a hospital to perform a life saving blood transfusion on a child whose
parents refused the treatment on religious grounds. Judge Wheeler held that "the state has a vital
interest in preserving the lives and health of its citizens."138 He recognized, however, that "The
First Amendment right to freedom of religion must be recognized and respected when its practice
is not contrary to the best interests of the citizens of the State."139 In authorizing the blood
transfusion over the objections of the natural parents, the Court cited Prince v. Massachusetts,
stating “acting to guard the general interest in a youth's well being, the State as parens patriae
may restrict the parent's control...the right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to
expose the ...child to ill health or death.”140
As noted, Jefferson and In the Interest of L.O.L. do not represent binding precedent for
decisions involving the spiritual treatment exemption. However, if other courts follow their
rationale in determining that state intervention is appropriate where treatment by prayer alone
poses a risk to a child‟s life or long term health, then the courts would essentially be limiting the
bounds of the spiritual exemption. Once again, religious tolerance would not be absolute, but
would be limited, this time to the point at which a child‟s life or long term health is placed in
danger. For a parent who has no medical knowledge or training, this point may be difficult to
ascertain. Since these parents will not seek the advice of medical professionals who could make
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such a determination, child welfare authorities may not be alerted that they should intervene until
it is too late.
Of course, it is possible that the spiritual exemption may be interpreted to preclude state
intervention, as one could argue that the legislature has granted special permission to parents
who practice spiritual treatment by prayer alone. Such an interpretation would require the court
to privilege one form of religious practice over others. Christian Science parents could withhold
medical treatment, such as a blood transfusion from their child, if they are using prayer as a
treatment instead. However, a Jehovah‟s Witness parent, who is not opting to use prayer, but
simply refuses a blood transfusion for their child on the grounds that taking blood into the body
through the mouth or veins violates God‟s law, would be subject to having their child removed
from their custody and the procedure ordered against their wishes by a Juvenile Court, as in the
case discussed above.141 The result would be inconsistent regulation of the same religiouslymotivated conduct. Courts would be forced to inquire into the religious rationale of the parent‟s
decision, and ultimately judge some beliefs as more worthy of legal protection than others.
Again, since there are no published decisions (or evidence of unpublished decisions)
which specifically address the question of whether the state can intervene and order life-saving
treatment when a parent is acting under the auspices of the spiritual exemption, we can only
discuss the theoretical implications. However, the lack of such cases raises several questions.
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When a child‟s medical situation begins to deteriorate, are the parents making a concerted effort
to keep this from becoming public knowledge for fear of state intervention? Are people who are
aware of the situation not reporting it because they believe in a parent‟s right to engage in
spiritual treatment? If it is reported, do local DFCS workers believe that the spiritual treatment
exemption gives special permission to these parents to withhold medical treatment, even in lifethreatening situations? If DFCS workers are referring these cases to the Special Assistant
Attorney Generals (SAGs) who handle such cases, are the SAGs choosing not to pursue these
matters, either initially or on appeal because of the uncertainty caused by the exemption statute?
Are medical examiners conducting thorough investigations into the deaths of children who die as
a result of untreated illnesses? If so, are they determining the cause of death to be “natural”
rather than “homicide” even if the deaths could have been prevented had the parents sought
medical treatment for the child?142 Answers to such questions may be difficult to discover, and
may vary greatly depending on the circumstances. However, this information would provide a
meaningful sense of how the spiritual treatment exemption is being interpreted and applied by
religious adherents and law enforcement agents.
Evidence of a Limitation to the Exemption?
There is some evidence that perhaps there are limits to which a parent may rely upon the
practice of spiritual healing. In 2004, Georgia became the last state in the nation to pass a Child
Endangerment Act. The act amended O.C.G.A. §16-5-70 which defines and criminalizes the
offense of cruelty to children.143 The statute as amended states that “any person commits the
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offense of cruelty to children in the second degree when such person with criminal negligence
causes a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental physical pain.”144
Criminal negligence, in turn, is defined as “an act or failure to act which demonstrates a willful,
wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety of others who might reasonably be expected to be
injured thereby.”145 One of the issues the Georgia legislature considered when enacting this
legislation was whether to include a spiritual exemption similar to the one found in Georgia‟s
definition of a deprived child.146 The legislature considered using the specific language of
Georgia‟s existing spiritual treatment exemption. They also considered the fact that other states
have opted not to include spiritual exemptions in their Child Endangerment Acts, and that many
states have repealed spiritual treatment exemptions to their child abuse/neglect statutes that had
been previously passed as a result of the CAPTA requirement.147 Earlier versions of a proposed
Child Endangerment Act in Georgia included a spiritual exemption.148 Ultimately, however, the
statute was enacted without a spiritual exemption.149 This occurred despite the Christian Science
Church‟s demand for one.150 According to Rita Swan, President of CHILD, (Children‟s
Healthcare is a Legal Duty), the church‟s lobbyist, Don Griffith, Ph.D., advocated for an
exemption, stating
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prayer is the ultimate weapon against child abuse and neglect…It must not be reduced or
penalized…It is in this state‟s best interest to protect those caring, loving parents who
have shown over the years that their method of healing deserves respect and appreciation
rather than suspicion and persecution.151
The legislature‟s decision not to include a spiritual exemption to the cruelty to children statute
may be perceived as an effort to restrict spiritual healing to that which does not cause “cruel or
excessive physical or mental pain.”152
The Catch 22
While many child advocates considered the passage of the Child Endangerment Act
without a religious exemption a triumph, there are concerns that because the legislature has not
repealed the existing exemptions, it may remain difficult for parents to be prosecuted under this
statute for harm caused from spiritual healing.153 As discussed above, the criminal statute
governing the act of contributing to the delinquency of a minor is not applicable to parents who
engage in spiritual healing.154 This exemption makes clear that the parent‟s conduct is not
considered criminal behavior. However, the amended cruelty to children statute would
criminalize the same behavior, if it resulted in cruel or excessive mental or physical pain. The
discrepancy between these statutes potentially poses a due process/fair notice problem that may
well dissuade prosecutors from bringing charges.
For instance, the State of Florida had to address a similar problem in Hermanson v.
State.155 When six-year-old Amy Hermanson died of untreated diabetes, the State of Florida
charged her parents with third degree murder. The Hermansons were members of the Christian
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Science church, and, in accordance with the tenets of their faith, they chose to treat their
daughter‟s condition with prayer alone. A Florida statute governing child abuse contained a
spiritual exemption clause similar to that of Georgia‟s, which allowed the parents to use prayer in
lieu of traditional medical treatment. However, when Amy Hermanson died, the State charged
the parents with homicide. The Florida Supreme Court ultimately overturned their conviction
finding that “a person of ordinary intelligence cannot be expected to understand the extent to
which reliance on spiritual healing is permitted and the point at which this reliance constitutes a
criminal offense.”156 The disparity between Georgia‟s statutes poses a similar problem. Rita
Swan of CHILD fears that this disparity “will probably have to be determined by a court over the
body of another dead child.”157
Existing Georgia case law does not provide any helpful guidance on this issue. A
thorough search of published case decisions, law review articles, journal articles, and newspaper
archives revealed only one documented case where Georgia prosecutors charged a
parent/guardian with manslaughter after their child died from religious-based medical neglect.158
Tommy Hester, 16 years old, died September 17, 1983, of a ruptured appendix and gangrene.
Tommy‟s biological mother had passed away, and he was living with his foster parents, Charles
and Judy Long, at the time of his death. Both the Longs and Tommy‟s biological mother
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belonged to Church of God of the Union Assembly, which “believes only God can heal.”159 The
Longs were charged with involuntary manslaughter after Tommy‟s death. When the case went to
trial, Judge Joseph Loggins granted a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty, saying “the
court feels there is not sufficient evidence in this case to support a conviction even if the jury
returned one.”160 The judge did not elaborate on his reasoning, giving no indication as to whether
or to what extent the existence of the spiritual exemption played a role in his decision.
Inconsistencies
It is theoretically possible that the courts could order medical intervention in
circumstances where a child faces significant health risks as a result of spiritual healing.
However, in practice, the existence of the exemptions to the definition of child deprivation and
child abuse essentially ties the hands of child welfare workers to investigate and determine when
this risk is imminent. The practical result is that the religious liberty interest of certain parents to
engage in spiritual healing is protected to a greater degree than the physical health and welfare of
their child. Passage of the child endangerment statute without a spiritual exemption may appear
to be a move towards limiting potential harm to children that may result from spiritual treatment,
but because of the existing exemptions, it does not change the fact that this behavior is still
allowed to continue. It only offers the possibility that if excessive physical or mental harm
results, then a parent could potentially face punishment. This does little to help the child who has
suffered the harm. It appears that, over time, the Georgia legislature has been riding the fence on
this issue. Statutes continue to allow spiritual healing as a substitute for medical treatment. In
fact, amendments to statutes containing spiritual exemptions have been passed as recently as
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2009, and these amendments did not repeal or modify the existing language in an effort limit the
scope of these exemptions.161 On the other hand, the legislature has not extended criminal
protection to religious parents when cruel or excessive physical or mental pain results from using
spiritual healing methods to the exclusion of medical treatment. Yet, existing exemptions that
prevent investigations by child welfare authorities in order to determine when children are at risk
for such harm have not been repealed. Reading these statutes together, it seems that the
legislature is, on the one hand, criminalizing excessive physical or mental pain that may result
from a failure of religious parents to seek medical care, but on the other, laying the foundation
for this suffering to occur, by preventing child welfare workers from investigating to prevent
such situations and paralyzing prosecutors with inconsistent statutes.
The Result: Unequal Protection
The legal result of Georgia‟s spiritual healing exemption is ironic. The Georgia
legislature grants parents who practice spiritual treatment by prayer legal protection from civil or
criminal liability, while it decreases the legal protection offered to their children. Unlike all other
children in the State of Georgia, these children cannot rely on the State to ensure their protection
from the potential physical harm of medical neglect. In this instance, a child‟s legal rights are
actually decreased by virtue of the religious beliefs of their parents. It is true that, in America,
children are not afforded the same legal rights as adults. However, Georgia has created via
statute a guarantee that they will be protected from harm, including medical neglect. The
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spiritual treatment exemption not only exempts parents from the obligation to seek medical
treatment for their children, but it exempts these children from the legal protection provided to
all other Georgia children. This may be one of the only instances under the law where religion
acts as a means to decrease the legal rights of an individual.
Interestingly, while the exemption acts to decrease the protection offered to these
children, it does not take their religious beliefs into consideration, only those of their parents.
This is not unusual. Children are generally assumed to share the religious beliefs of their parents
and do not really have a right to religious freedom apart from the beliefs of their family.
However, in this case, the failure to consider a child‟s religious beliefs has the effect of
relegating them to the role of mere conduits. Because their own religious beliefs are irrelevant,
they are simply the means through which religious freedom is granted to their parents.
The specific role of children as religious agents is one largely dependent on theological
interpretation. However, in his essay “Material Children,” Religious Studies scholar Robert Orsi,
explains that one “medium of religious materialization - for rendering the invisible visible and
present - of special importance to religious practitioners is children.”162 According to Orsi,
“Children‟s bodies, rationalities, imaginations, and desires have all been privileged media for
giving substance to religious meaning, for making the sacred present and material, not only for
children, but through them too, for adults in relation to them.”163 This is apparent in the case of
Georgia‟s spiritual treatment exemption, as it does not act to promote the religious freedom of
the children whose lives may be cut short as a result, rather, it allows for parents to withhold
medical treatment as an expression of their own religious beliefs. It is through these children‟s
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bodies that their parents‟ faith is made material. Discussing the biblical story of the sacrifice of
Isaac, and drawing on the work of Elaine Scarry, Orsi concludes that “The story of Abraham and
Isaac „does not merely describe the rigors of belief, what is required of belief, but the structure of
belief itself, the taking of one‟s insides and giving them over to something wholly outside of
oneself‟ - God - „as Abraham agrees to sacrifice the interior of his and Sarah‟s bodies, and to
participate in that surrender.‟”164 But Orsi reminds readers that
Children are uniquely available to stand for the interiority of a culture and to offer
embodied access to the inchoate possibilities of the culture‟s imaginary futures. But the
“interior” of Abraham‟s body is a grown child with his own feelings and perceptions.
Isaac is a boy who understands that he is about to be killed. Child sacrifice is not selfimmolation but the murder of a separate human being whose identity is not exhausted by
his or her status as a son or daughter nor as a sign of the future of the social world. It is
this fluidity - if not the actual erasure of the boundaries - between the body of the child
and the interiority of the adult engaging the child in a religious setting that makes
possible the materialization of a sacred reality through the bodies, minds, and
imaginations of children.165
The Georgia spiritual healing exemption seems to accept this erasure of boundaries
between “the body of the child and the interiority of the adult.” These children represent their
parents‟ sacrifice, they stand as a testament to their parents‟ faith, but they are not recognized
themselves as “a child with his [or her] own feelings and perceptions.” Children have not been
vested with the autonomy to make decisions regarding their faith for themselves. While it is true
that the state does not recognize children as autonomous citizens in many respects, it is
interesting that Georgia law does allow for children to make, or at the very least, have a voice, in
other important decisions regarding their lives where the stakes are not nearly so high. For
instance, an unemancipated minor may file a petition to waive the parental consent requirement
for abortions. Under Georgia law, the requirement of parental consent shall be waived if a
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Juvenile Court judge determines that the unemancipated minor is “mature enough and wellenough informed to make the abortion decision in consultation with her physician, independently
of the wishes of such minor‟s parent or guardian.”166 In addition, “in all custody cases in which
the child has reached the age of 14 years, the child shall have the right to select the parent with
whom he or she desires to live.”167 Furthermore, in all custody cases, a judge must consider the
desires of a child who has reached the age of 11, though this preference is not controlling.168
However, according to the letter of the law, a child of 17 years, 11 months, and 29 days has no
choice in the decision of whether they wish to receive life-saving medical treatment if their
parents opt to withhold such treatment on the basis of their religious beliefs. Whether the child
agrees with these beliefs is irrelevant under Georgia law. To use Orsi‟s language, it is the
“interiority” which the law protects, rather than the body of the child.
In Miskimens, this distinction was not lost on the court. In his decision, Judge Evans
stated:
In the instant case, it is not the personal religious practices of these parents which are
sought to be regulated. An important line must be drawn between the right of an
individual to practice his religion by refusing medical treatment for his own illness and
that of a parent to practice his religion by refusing to obtain or permit medical treatment
for another person, i.e., his child. This court, as with any government entity, can neither
know nor care whether someone who relies solely on faith healing for his own affliction
is religiously or scripturally „correct.‟ But the right to hold one‟s own religious beliefs,
and to act in conformity with those beliefs, does not and cannot include the right to
endanger the life or health of others, including his or her children.169
Citing Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court held “Parents may be free to become martyrs
themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of
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their children before they have reached the full age and legal discretion when they can make that
choice for themselves.”170
However, religious practitioners do not see themselves as making martyrs of their
children. They understand themselves to be protecting their children‟s spiritual interests, which,
in their minds, outweigh the corporeal interests which the state is concerned with protecting.
Assumptions Regarding the Static Nature of Religious Belief
The Georgia spiritual exemptions for faith healing, vaccination requirements, and
newborn testing appear to assume that religious beliefs are static, unchanging over the years, and
from one generation to the next. However, in reality, religious belief is often transient in nature.
Decisions based on an individual‟s religious belief today may not represent the decisions that
they will make a year from now. The aforementioned President of CHILD, is a telling example
of this. In 1977, Rita Swan and her husband, Doug, were practicing Christian Scientists, as they
had been their whole lives. When their sixteen-month-old son Mathew fell ill, they treated him
according to the tenets of their faith, with prayer alone. After two weeks of suffering, a Christian
Science practitioner told Matthew‟s parents that he might have a broken bone. Christian
Scientists are allowed to go to doctors for setting of broken bones, so the Swans took Matthew to
a hospital, where his illness was diagnosed as Hemophilus Influenza Meningitis. He lived for a
week in intensive care, before finally succumbing to his illness. The bacterial form of meningitis
which killed Matthew Swan is nearly 100% fatal without antibiotic treatment and 95% curable
with antibiotics. Today, it is also vaccine-preventable. Following Matthew‟s death, the Swans
left the Christian Science church and later founded CHILD.171
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Rita Swan is now one of the leading advocates for a legal right to children‟s healthcare
and actively lobbies against spiritual exemptions that permit parents to use prayer in lieu of
medical treatment for their children. Swan‟s religious beliefs have clearly changed over the last
34 years, yet her son is not alive because of the religious beliefs she once held. Likewise, in
Georgia, children are at risk based on the beliefs that their parents hold at the time they choose to
withhold medical treatment. The law does not seem to contemplate that these beliefs may
change, or that children should be protected to ensure that they are able to reach an age when
they can choose these religious beliefs for themselves. In Miskimens, the court noted equal
protection problems with the spiritual exemption for faith healing because it failed to protect all
children to the same degree until “they have their own opportunity to make life‟s important
religious decisions for themselves upon attainment of the age of reason.” After all, the Court
reasoned, “a child may someday choose to reject the most sincerely held of his parents‟ religious
beliefs.”172 All other Georgia children, both religious and non-religious, are protected by the state
until they reach an age when it is presumed that they can make these decisions for themselves. At
that time, if they choose prayer over medical treatment, the State will not interfere with their
decision.
In Georgia, children of certain religious parents are not protected to the same degree as
other children. The transient nature of religious belief notwithstanding, the physical health and
welfare of these children is placed secondary to the right of their parents to practice their
religion. As a result, some of these children may never reach an age at which they can choose to
accept or reject the faith of their parents.
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Historical Trends
Georgia statutes regulating the health and welfare of minor children have contained
spiritual exemptions in various forms since 1957. At times, the language appears to protect only
parents who are associated with certain kinds of institutional religious organizations. At other
times, spiritual exemptions are offered to parents who may not necessarily claim loyalty to any
particular religious institution, doctrine, or creed. No clear patterns are apparent from an
examination of the historical record.
The vaccination exemption, the oldest of the statutory exemptions, at one time contained
language that limited its application to parents who objected to the vaccination requirement
because it was not in accordance with the teachings of a “recognized religious organization of
which he or she is an adherent.”173 In 1964, it was amended to state that the parent or guardian
must object to the vaccination requirement “on the grounds that such immunization conflicts
with the religious tenets and practices of a well recognized religious denomination, whose
teachings include reliance on prayer or spiritual means alone for healing, of which he is an
adherent or member.”174 In 1968, the vaccination exemption was amended again, seemingly
reverting back to the previous requirements, and granted an exemption to parents if the
immunizations conflicted “with the religious tenets and practices of a recognized church or
religious denomination of which said parent or guardian is an adherent member.”175
In 1966, following the first vaccination amendment, the statute governing metabolic
testing for newborns was enacted. It included an exemption which stated that the testing
requirement would not apply to “any infant whose parents object thereto on the grounds that
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such tests conflict with their religious tenets and practices.”176 However, as noted by the second
vaccination amendment of 1968, this was not the beginning of a trend towards accepting
individual religious belief as sufficient to receive an exemption. The definition of a deprived
child was amended to include a spiritual exemption in 1968 as well. “Necessary care” for a
child‟s well-being was stated to include “treatment by spiritual means alone through prayer in
accordance with the tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious denomination by a
duly accredited practitioner thereof.”177 This statute was amended in 1971 to state that “no child
who in good faith is being treated solely by spiritual means alone through prayer in accordance
with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by a duly
accredited practitioner thereof shall, for that reason alone, be considered to be a „deprived
child.‟”178
As of 1971, aside from the newborn testing exemption, all other exemptions required
some kind of institutional affiliation. However, in 1973, the vaccination requirement was
amended again, stating that the statute shall not apply if the immunization “conflicts with the
religious beliefs of said parent or guardian.”179 Yet again, this does not indicate a precursor to
changes in existing or future exemptions. In 1993, the definition of an abused child was amended
to include a spiritual exemption with identical language to the exemption found in the definition
of a deprived child (“no child who in good faith is being treated solely by spiritual means alone
through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious
denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof shall, for that reason alone, be considered
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to be a „deprived child‟”).180 This same year, the statute governing child abuse and deprivation
records also adopted this language.181 Two years later, this identical language was incorporated
into the statute governing the Child Abuse Central Registry.182
In 2004, the legislature considered including this language in the Child Endangerment
Act, (which amended the offense of cruelty to children) but ultimately enacted the law without a
spiritual exemption, indicating a possible intent to limit the scope of the spiritual treatment
exemption. The passage of the statute which criminalized female genital mutilation was passed
in 2005, and explicitly stated that religion would not serve as a defense. The intentional absence
of a religious exemption in both of these statutes (one certainly more explicitly than the other),
might lead one to think that the era of the spiritual exemption was coming to an end. However, in
2009, the legislature amended the spiritual exemption section of the statute governing the child
abuse and deprivation records (amended in 1993 to include spiritual treatment exemption
language) but did not take the opportunity to repeal or modify the exemption.
No clear historical trends can be discerned from the passage and/or amendments to
statutes containing spiritual exemptions, except that explicit exemptions, at least in the context of
child welfare law, appear to be limited to decisions involving medical treatment or prevention.
However, this project did not include a thorough historical/political analysis which may shed
more light on this issue. It is clear that Khalid Adem‟s arrest for allegedly circumcising his
daughter initiated the development and eventual passage of the statute which criminalizes female
circumcision and which explicitly denies a religious defense. However, no additional definitive
connections were found between the cases and/or statutes that were discussed.
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CONCLUSIONS
In granting explicit statutory exemptions for spiritual healing, vaccination requirements,
and newborn testing, the State of Georgia treats religious motivation as a rationale that stands
apart from other forms of parental discretion. Religion is treated as different and unique, and
religious parents as more worthy of parental autonomy. But in so doing, these exemptions result
in legally defined religious orthodoxy. Applying these statutes requires judges to determine what
counts as real religion, or what Winnifred Sullivan calls “legal religion.”183 Judicial enforcement
of the right granted by these exemptions would require judges “to define which religious belief
or practice is authentic, and therefore, legally significant.”184
The potential result is inconsistent regulation of the same religiously motivated conduct.
This inconsistency is apparent when looking at the language of the spiritual treatment exemption.
A parent who belongs to a recognized church or religious denomination may use prayer in lieu of
medical treatment while a parent who does not attend a particular institutional religious
organization, but has an unwavering faith in the power of prayer to heal her child, is offered no
exemption from the requirement that he or she seek medical care for their child.
The mere existence of these exemptions results in a state sanctioned determination that
some religious conduct rises above the mandates of the law, while other religious conduct does
not. Perhaps this would make sense if the regulations were based on public policy concerns
regarding the protection of children, i.e. if the conduct allowed posed no risk to children while
the prohibited conduct was inherently dangerous. Instead, the conduct which poses the most
significant risk of harm, the omission of medical treatment, where death may be the end result, is
permitted, while the removal of the clitoral prepuce, a procedure likened to a male circumcision
183
184
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and which poses little risk to a child‟s long term health or sexual function, is explicitly outlawed.
The resulting disparate treatment among religious individuals leads one to believe that these
exemptions do little to foster religious freedom as a whole and more to privilege certain kinds of
religion.
The exemption for spiritual treatment through prayer also results in the disparate
treatment of children based on the beliefs of their parents. It places certain children at a greater
risk of harm by effectively denying them the State guarantees of intervention and protection that
are offered to all other children. The religious freedom of these parents is deemed superior to the
State‟s interest in protecting all of its children. The implication that can be drawn is that the State
values the rights of these parents to practice their faith more than it values the lives of these
children.
When the law is silent, and determinations have been left up to judges to decide when
religious motivation warrants an exemption from the legal standard of conduct set for all other
citizens, judges have not typically accepted religion as a defense. This is particularly true when
the belief or practice at issue is not connected with widely-held mainstream beliefs or practices.
However, one fact that must be noted is that most of these cases that have made it to the
courtroom and into the headlines have involved “fringe” religious practices, indicating the
possibility that child welfare workers, police, district attorneys, and others “on the ground” may
be choosing to make their own determinations as to whether or not religion should serve as a
valid exemption to the law. When these cases do make it to court, they are still being heard by
jurists who may very well let their own perceptions of religion influence their determinations.
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Possible Rationale for These Exemptions
So why keep these exemptions when they appear to conflict with judicial decisions
regarding religious conduct that poses a risk of harm to children, the consequences seem so
contrary to public policy of protecting the health and welfare of children, and the results offend
the fundamental democratic notion of equal treatment under the law? Scholar and author Marci
Hamilton believes spiritual exemptions like the ones that exist in Georgia are the result of a
romanticized idea of religious freedom on the part of the legislators, and that this conception of
religious freedom does not consider carefully the potential consequences that may be associated
with specific exemptions.185 Hamilton calls this idea that religious individuals and institutions
are always doing what is right a “hazardous myth.”186 Robert Orsi has also commented on this
notion that religion is always benign. He reminds readers that religion was the motivating factor
behind the civil rights movement, but also the mass suicide of Jonestown. “There is a quality to
the religious imagination that blurs distinctions, obliterates boundaries…and this can, and often
does, contribute to domestic violence, not peace. Religion is often enough cruel and dangerous,
and the same impulses that result in a special kind of compassion, also lead to destruction,
among the same people at the same time.”187
Hamilton argues that it is for precisely this reason that religious entities should be subject
to the same laws as other citizens, “unless they can prove that exempting them will cause no
harm to others.”188 Ironically, the Georgia Constitution seems to agree. It states “the right of
freedom of religion shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify
185
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practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.”189 Yet, spiritual exemptions which
pose a risk of harm to children have been granted and maintained for the past 54 years.190
Hamilton also notes that part of the problem is a lack of public education surrounding
religious exemptions. She notes that while “abortion has the attention of the American public,
deaths of children arising from religiously motivated conduct have not galvanized the
people…Few - other than those who benefit and the legislators that grant the benefit - know
about or understand the exemptions or their consequences.”191 It may also be true that the
legislators themselves are not fully educated about what the First Amendment requires. Rita
Swan notes that state and federal legislators often agree to requests for spiritual exemptions
based on vague assumptions that the First Amendment requires religious exemptions, despite the
fact that courts have made clear this is not a constitutional right.192
Another reason for the continued existence of these exemptions may have less to do with
religious tolerance and more to do with politics. While the majority of Georgia legislators and
their constituents may not engage in faith healing themselves, to argue for a repeal of the existing
spiritual exemptions would require legislators to publically call for limitations on the reliance on
prayer. While their mainstream constituents may not rely solely on prayer to treat medical
illness, many do believe in the power of prayer and the will of God.193 Efforts to repeal the
existing spiritual exemptions could be perceived as a threat to these fundamental ideals, whether
or not one agrees with the specific theology protected by the exemptions. District attorneys, who
189
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are also elected officials in the State of Georgia, may also consider this possibility when deciding
whether to charge a parent for the unintended results of their reliance on prayer alone, such as
when a child suffers serious medical consequences or death. This may be one possible reason
why there are so few cases on record that deal with this particular issue.
Drawing the Line
The line which Georgia draws between religious freedom and child abuse is a squiggly
one. It includes some religious conduct but not other kinds. Its boundary does not appear to be
guided by a singular public policy commitment or a dedication to consistency in the realm of
religious freedom. It does appear to place on opposite sides those practices which are connected
with widely held or accepted religious ideology and those which are not. The line is not always
clearly drawn, but where it is, it unmistakably protects the conduct of some religious individuals
while punishing others, and it places some children at a greater risk to suffer physical harm.
These children‟s parents may believe that their welfare is dependent upon the will of God, but
the will of the State certainly does not appear insignificant in determining their fate.
Georgia‟s use of spiritual exemptions to draw the line between child abuse and free
exercise does not promote religious freedom as much as it creates religious norms and a
hierarchy of religion as determined by legislators and judges. The tolerance that they offer to
some necessitates intolerance to others. Religious freedom for all kinds of religious practitioners
is impossible under these exemptions.
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